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INTRODUCTION
Petitioner, Jackson Peters, is appealing the Court of Appeals’ affirmation of a trial court order granting summary judgment in favor of Respondent, O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc., on its claims of intrusion upon
seclusion and violation of the Marshall State Human Rights Act.
The first issue in this case concerns whether a company is liable for
a claim on intrusion upon seclusion for installed software on a company
owned laptop that took pictures from the laptop inside an employee’s
home. The final issue concerns whether a company violates the Marshall
State Human Rights Act for firing an employee based on his sexual
orientation.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Peters’ complaint, filed in the Marshall County Circuit Court, alleged violations of intrusion upon seclusion and the Marshall State
Human Rights Act. Following discovery, O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.
moved for summary judgment on both counts. The circuit court granted
O’Plenty Enterprises Inc.’s motion as to both counts. Peters appealed to
the First District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the circuit court’s order. Peters then petitioned for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Marshall. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal the affirmation of
the summary judgment order on both counts.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
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1. R. at 3. The remainder of the Statement of Facts presented here is set forth verbatim as it appears in the court of appeals decision; the footnotes have been renumbered.
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The parties have stipulated that the court of appeals decision shall
serve as the record on appeal. The court of appeals decision1 sets forth
the facts of the case as follows:
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. is a real estate development company
headquartered in the state of Marshall. The company, founded over
thirty years ago by life-long Marshall resident Duffy O’Plenty
(“O’Plenty”), is a family-owned, family-led corporation. O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. evolved from O’Plenty’s father’s company, Donald O’Plenty &
Son, which concentrated on his father’s preferred field of lower and middle-class rental housing in the blue collar neighborhoods of Marshall
City, the capital of the State of Marshall. With his entrepreneurial skills
and hard work ethic, O’Plenty managed to transform Donald O’Plenty &
Son into a significant real estate development company with numerous
high profile development project deals in Marshall City and the surrounding areas. O’Plenty was known to recognize the economic opportunity in the financially troubled areas, which he transformed by engaging
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in large building projects, utilizing attractive architectural design. Thus,
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. earned high profits while also gaining public
recognition by creating jobs during difficult financial times. Currently,
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. owns and runs a significant number of commercial and residential real estate properties including some of the most
popular hotels in the area that it acquired for extremely low prices after
the real estate crisis of 2008. Because of its aggressive acquisition plans
and collegial working environment, O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. was the
fastest growing real estate company in the State of Marshall in 2010.
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. currently employs ninety-five individuals.
O’Plenty followed in his father’s footsteps and founded O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. on biblically-based principles, including closing his business on Sundays and all major religious holidays. The company also
invests in local communities, supporting religious schools and offering
scholarships to underprivileged children. O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. also
sought to promote its own employees from within, including offering
management-training courses and flexible and alternate work arrangements for its employees, as well as telecommuting. O’Plenty was known
to be involved in the day-to-day running of the company and he had acquired the reputation of a demanding, but fair, employer.
Despite its recent growth, O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. remains a family-run company with O’Plenty at the helm and his four children serving
in executive roles. Because O’Plenty is very involved in the day-to-day
operations of his company, he strives to be the face of his brand. He has
also been very outspoken about his core beliefs, upon which he built and
continues to run his business. O’Plenty also became involved in local
politics and in early 2010, announced himself to be a potential candidate
for Governor of Marshall in the 2012 elections. However, a few months
later, O’Plenty decided against running. Instead, O’Plenty endorsed and
supported the gubernatorial candidate Tom Timmons, who was challenging incumbent governor Ed Edison during the 2012 election season. One
of Timmons’ core platforms was his opposition to same-sex marriage.
This was a highly debated issue in the state of Marshall since, currently,
the State does not legally recognize same-sex marriage. Numerous
groups had been increasingly rallying in favor of legalizing same-sex
marriage in the State of Marshall. Because they shared many of the
same beliefs, O’Plenty contributed financially to Timmons’ campaign and
made the venues owned by O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. available for Timmons to use for fundraising locations and other campaign related events.
O’Plenty himself spoke in one of the fundraising events in mid-2010
where he expressed his support for Timmons’ political platform and
stated: “Same sex marriage is unnatural. Homosexuality is a sin against
God. It is unnatural and detrimental and ultimately destructive to the
foundations of our society.”
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Jackson Peters (“Peters”) is an at-will employee with O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. Peters had been employed with O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.
since 2000. He was also a life-long resident of Marshall, growing up in
the small town of Petersville. He began his career as a low-ranking employee in O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. After only two years, due to his outstanding work ethic, he was offered a position in one of the company’s
management training courses at the company headquarters. After he
completed the management-training course, Peters accepted a job at the
corporate headquarters and moved 200 miles from his hometown. Peters
worked his way up through company ranks and in early 2009, O’Plenty
personally promoted Peters to Regional Project Supervisor. Peters’ assigned territory was his hometown because of his familiarity with the
city and other local businesses.
Because it offered telecommuting to its employees, O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. provided company-issued laptops to all of its upper level
managers and supervisors. According to a report issued by Henderson
Databases in 2008, telecommuters made up more than one-quarter of the
United States workforce. The report concluded that the number of
telecommuting workers will increase substantially because new, mobile
technologies will make it easier for employees to work anywhere at any
time; the entering workforce will be more tech savvy; and alternative
work arrangements will benefit employers. With more workers working
from home, employers like O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. are faced with several issues, including how to confirm employees are actually working
when they say they are and how to ensure company information is protected from careless employees misplacing equipment. It also is concerned over the theft of its data.
O’Plenty was particularly concerned with the proprietary information that could be stolen from company-issued devices. Therefore, he had
his Information Technology (“IT”) department install software called
Lost & Found® on all its mobile devices, including laptops. When remotely activated, the Lost & Found® software would activate a webcam
embedded in the computer. The webcam would take photos every five
minutes while the user was connected to the Internet and then transmit
the photos back to O’Plenty Enterprises Inc.’s web server. The program
would keep taking photos until an employee of the company deactivated
the Lost & Found® software. The software also sent a copy of the image
displayed on the laptop’s screen while it was in use. The company had
found the software particularly useful, recovering all ten lost or stolen
devices over the eight-month period the software had been in use. Law
enforcement was also able to successfully prosecute six of the ten thieves
based on the pictures taken by the software showing the thieves using
the stolen laptops.
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2. Instead of attaching the Petersville VIP list, he attached the VIP list for the Almonville event held three weeks earlier.
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As a Regional Project Supervisor, Peters was issued a company
laptop. Because his territory was 200 miles away from his home near
corporate headquarters, he often traveled for his job. In early 2010, after
almost a year as Regional Project Supervisor, Peters was informed that
in addition to his regular duties, he would be in charge of coordinating
and facilitating several election fundraisers for candidate Timmons at
the hotels owed by O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. in his territory. He was
uneasy with this part of his job because he supported Governor Edison
who was in favor of legalizing same-sex marriage. However, Peters, a
gay man, had never made known his sexual orientation in his work environment but for a limited number of friends and co-workers. As the record shows, at that time, Peters had stated to this circle of friends: “my
job is what I do, not what I am, so I will just do my job as a professional
and that’s the end of it.”
After four months of coordinating these election events, Peters had
grown increasingly tired and stressed and his performance started to
slightly suffer. On two separate occasions, Peters raised his objections
with his supervisors that overseeing Timmons’ political campaign was
not part of his job and took a toll on him physically and mentally.
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.’s representatives dismissed his concerns stating that part of his job was making sure that any event and project taking place in his assigned territory was successful. During the last trip to
Petersville, in July 2010, he received news that his beloved Labrador Retriever had suddenly died of unknown causes. Distracted, Peters emailed the wrong VIP list to the security before the start of the event.2
He also forgot to arrange transportation for candidate Timmons. Timmons eventually made it to the event, but arrived thirty minutes late.
Some VIPs were initially denied entry to the event, only being permitted
entry when Timmons showed up. After the event, Timmons was upset
and personally called O’Plenty to complain about the “fiasco” as he characterized the event. Peters was advised to fly back and provide the headquarters with a detailed report on the events of Petersville within the
next forty-eight hours. Peters, significantly upset, checked out of his hotel in a hurry and forgot his company-issued laptop. When he got to the
airport, he realized his laptop was missing. Peters immediately called
O’Plenty Enterprises Inc.’s help line to report his missing laptop.
The next morning, Peters received a call from the hotel informing
him he left his laptop in his room. Because Peters was a frequent guest
at the hotel, the hotel manager told him that he arranged for the laptop
to be sent to Peters’ home address via overnight courier because he knew
how important the laptop was to Peters. The laptop arrived later that
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morning. Peters called the IT department at O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.
to inform it that his laptop had been recovered, but he had to leave a
voicemail message. He immediately checked his laptop to make sure it
was working. After about forty-five minutes he moved to his home office
and begun working on his report that was due the next morning.
From the time Peters called the IT Department to report his laptop
had been recovered and when the IT Department received his voicemail
message, the Lost & Found® software had been running on Peters’
laptop for approximately four hours. Almost fifty still photos were captured and transmitted back to O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.’s web server.
Most of the photos included pictures Peters had on the wall directly behind him visible by the webcam while he worked at his desk. Several of
the photos showed Peters with his partner, including one where they
were embracing and kissing during what appeared to be a “commitment”
ceremony. Peters was also in a photo shaking hands with a prominent
gay activist in Marshall, who was a big supporter of the incumbent governor. Additionally, several rainbow colored flags surrounded the
pictures.3
Per company policy, whenever a device was reported lost or stolen,
any information sent to the web server by the Lost & Found® software
was to be immediately sent to Human Resources. Human Resources was
then required to send the information to O’Plenty because he liked to
work directly with law enforcement to help recover lost or stolen items.

Three weeks after O’Plenty received the photos taken from Peters’
company-issued laptop, Peters was called into Human Resources (“HR”).
He was informed that he was being terminated due to poor job performance. He was given his exit interview and instructed to turn over all company-issued electronics. At the end of the meeting, Peters requested a
copy of his employee file, per the Employee Handbook (see Appendix A).
Among the various progress reports discussing his tenure with the company, he discovered a document titled “Stolen/Lost Laptop Report.” The
Report made reference to the incident that had taken place a few weeks
back and included a description of pictures taken of him while working
from his home office. He asked the HR representative about the Report
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3. The rainbow flag is an international symbol of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender movement. See Colors of the Cause, LGBT MOVEMENT, http://www.colourlovers.
com/blog/2008/02/15/colors-of-the-cause-lgbt-movement (last visited Apr. 30, 2012).
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Shortly after this incident, Peters was informed that he was suspended from his duties pending investigation of the event. During this
time period, Peters found himself isolated in the workplace. The record
shows that on two separate occasions, his co-workers did not invite him
to company-related social events.
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In 2011, Jackson Peters filed suit against O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.
for: (1) intrusion upon seclusion; and (2) discrimination in violation of the
Marshall Human Rights Act. Following discovery, O’Plenty Enterprises,
Inc. moved for summary judgment on both counts. The circuit court
granted the motion on both counts.
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and she informed him about the Lost & Found® software. After asking
for copies of the photos, HR eventually turned over copies to Peters.
Peters demanded a full investigation into the matter claiming that
his termination was not due to the unfortunate incident at Petersville,
but due to the revelation of his sexual orientation. Peters claimed that
his performance was excellent with the exception of the aforementioned
event and only after it was revealed he was homosexual did he suffer
alienation at the workplace and finally termination. Peters pointed out
that there have been instances in the past where regional supervisors
failed in their duties, but they were treated much more leniently. More
specifically Peters mentioned J. Erwin who, in March 2009, accidentally
included in an e-mail to a provider a document containing sensitive proprietary information. J. Erwin was reprimanded and re-assigned to another position but not terminated. Similarly, in fall of 2009, L. Walker
refused to invite several of the women in O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.’s
management training course to a major business conference at the downtown Sharwood Hotel. At that point, HR suspended Walker with pay
while it investigated the incident. In February 2010, Walker was ordered
to attend sensitivity training. He never completed his training and was
allowed to resume his duties. Even with several complaints filed against
him for this incident, he was not demoted or penalized for any of his
behavior. Both Erwin and Walker were heterosexual and supporters of
Timmons. Peters also complained that the mistake, which was the reason for his termination, related to a project that was not even included in
the job description when he accepted the position of Regional Project
Supervisor.
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. refused to initiate an investigation and
claimed that it does not need a reason to terminate Peters since he is an
at-will employee. However, the company pointed out that the Petersville
incident was a major public relations blunder that cost the company and
O’Plenty tremendously, both in terms of credibility in the marketplace,
in the community and O’Plenty’s reputation. Peters has not been able to
present any other comparable incidents within the company. In addition,
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. reminded him that overseeing projects, no
matter the nature of the project, in his assigned territory, was part of his
job.
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The two issues raised on appeal are: (1) whether the court erred in
affirming O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.’s summary judgment on Peters’
claim of intrusion upon seclusion; and, (2) whether the court erred in
affirming O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.’s summary judgment on Peters’
claim of violation of the Marshall Human Rights Act.
ANALYSIS
STANDARD

OF

REVIEW

C M
Y K

10/02/2013 12:46:52

4. MARSHALL R. CIV. P. 56(c) (cited at R. 3). Rule 56(c) is similar or identical to the
corresponding provision of the federal rules, FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
6. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
7. Delta Sav. Bank v. United States, 265 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001).
8. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
9. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
10. Id. at 324.
11. Purtill v. Hess, 489 N.E.2d 867, 871 (Ill. 1986).
12. Id.
13. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247 (emphasis omitted).
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Summary judgment is a procedural device that enables a court to
dispose of part or all of a case prior to trial. In the State of Marshall,
Rule 56 of the Marshall Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary judgment. Under this rule, summary judgment is proper only if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.4 The court considers the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits in assessing whether summary judgment is proper.5 A genuine issue of material
fact exists only if “a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence presented.”6
An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standard as the trial court.7 The reviewing court determines whether a genuine issue of material fact exists by viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor of that party.8 The
moving party has the burden of identifying the material facts that are
without genuine dispute and support the entry of summary judgment in
favor of the moving party.9 The non-moving party, for its part, must
identify which material facts raise genuine issues of dispute.10 Because
the entry of summary judgment “is a drastic means of disposing of litigation,”11 it should be granted only when the moving party’s right to relief
is “clear and free from doubt.”12 However, the mere fact that there exists
“some alleged factual dispute between the parties”13 or “some metaphys-

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 87 Side A

10/02/2013 12:46:52

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\29-4\SFT405.txt

2012]

unknown

Seq: 9

1-OCT-13

BENCH MEMORANDUM

14:53

681

ical doubt as to the material facts”14 is insufficient to defeat a motion for
summary judgment.
INTRUSION

INTO

SECLUSION

General

Elements
This issue was a case of first impression before the district court and
the first time the State of Marshall allowed a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion. In situations like this, Marshall courts have turned
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which describes the tort of intrusion
upon the seclusion of another in the following manner: “(o)ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion
of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”15 There is no requirement of publication or
communication to a third party in cases of intrusion upon a plaintiff’s
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14. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
15. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).
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Peters will assert that the software installed on his company laptop
issued by O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. took pictures of him inside his home
and therefore, constituted an invasion of his privacy because it intruded
upon his seclusion. In general, Peters will argue that the photographs
taken via the webcam was an intentional intrusion. Furthermore, Peters will argue that because he was in his home he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. He will also assert that his former employer not
only activated the webcam through the Lost & Found® software, but left
it running for four hours after he had called the company to inform it
that the laptop was found. Finally, Peters will argue that the fifty pictures taken inside his home without his knowledge and permission
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will argue that it did not intentionally intrude upon Peters’ privacy because it only ran the software until it received a message that the lost laptop had been found. Further, the
company will argue that it was specifically authorized to activate the
webcam as the computer was company property and Peters was put on
notice through his acceptance of the Employee Handbook. Finally,
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will argue that a reasonable person would not
find the intrusion offensive or objectionable because of the limited scope,
and that revealing Peters’ sexual orientation is not highly offensive to a
reasonable person.
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seclusion.16 Both parties should consider “both the manner of intrusion
as well as the nature of the information acquired that must rise to the
level of being highly offensive to a reasonable person.”17
Therefore, to assert a successful claim for intrusion upon seclusion,
Peters must prove the following elements: (1) the pictures taken by the
company laptop was an intentional intrusion into his solitude or seclusion; and (2) the intrusion was highly offensive to a reasonable person.
1. Intrusion into the Solitude or Seclusion of Another
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16. Plaxico v. Michael, 735 So.2d 1036, 1039 (Miss. 1999).
17. Werner v. Kliewer, 710 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Kan. 1985).
18. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. B (1977).
19. See Stressman v. Am. Black Hawk Broad. Co., 416 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Iowa 1987).
20. R. at 6, discussing the pictures taken included photos showing Peters with his partner, and a photo of him shaking hands with a prominent gay activist in Marshall, who was
a big supporter of the incumbent governor.
21. 874 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
22. Shulman v. Group W Prods. Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 230-31 (Cal. 1998) (“[a] man
whose home may be entered at the will of another. . .whose marital and familial intimacies
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Peters will argue that it has been well settled that an intrusion does
not have to be a physical intrusion. Restatement (Second) of Torts states
that the invasion may be physical, but it may also be through “the use of
the defendant’s senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or
overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs, as by looking into his upstairs
windows with binoculars or tapping his telephone wires.”18 Peters will
argue that the use of a webcam encompasses this type of intrusion and
without a homeowner’s knowledge and consent is a form of eavesdropping in the twenty-first century. Furthermore, even though people expose themselves to family and friends in their homes, “that does not
mean they have opened the door to television cameras.”19 In the case at
bar, the pictures recorded by the software may not have been taken in
front of others, but the pictures taken of Peters while in his home captured the intimate details of his life.20
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will counter-argue that the case at bar
was not an intrusion because the camera was inside a company-issued
laptop and not placed inside Peters’ home. For example, in Burns v.
Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc., an agent of an employer gained access to the
inside of an employee’s home under false pretenses and secretly recorded
the conversation.21 Furthermore, Peters voluntarily placed the laptop in
his home with the knowledge it contained tracking software.
Peters will also argue that because he was in his home he had a
reasonable expectation of solitude or seclusion. The home has long been
considered an area where people have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.22 Peters will argue that courts have found that the non-
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physical intrusions similar to what happened in his case have been found
to be intrusions upon seclusion. For example, in Summers v. Bailey, the
court found that a non-physical intrusion was analogous to a trespass
into the plaintiff’s home through eavesdropping by a microphone.23 Peters will likely argue that courts have held that an intrusion takes place
if a person “had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation, or data source.”24
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will likely counter-argue that Peters was
in his home office and captured him working and not in any type of personal situation. Additionally, as case law has developed through the
years, to support a claim for intrusion upon seclusion more is required
than just an oblique reference to private sexual matters.25 Courts have
ruled that sexual comments and brief touching could not support a claim
of intrusion upon seclusion.26 Therefore, O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will
draw the analogy that the pictures captured by the company software in
Peters’ home office was not an intrusion because the pictures only contained references to Peters’ sexual orientation.
2. Intentional Intrusion

C M
Y K
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may be overseen at the will of another, is less of a man, has less human dignity, on that
account”); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (where the Supreme Court
held that “all details are intimate details”).
23. 55 F.3d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B
cmt. b (1977) (“when a picture is taken of a plaintiff while he is in the privacy of his
home. . .the taking of the picture may be considered an intrusion into the plaintiff’s privacy
just as eavesdropping or looking into his upstairs windows with binoculars are considered
an invasion of his privacy”).
24. Sanchez-Scott v. Alza Pharms, 86 Cal.App. 4th 365, 372 (2001).
25. Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, 944 P.2d 374, 378 (C.A. Utah 1997).
26. Haehn v. City of Hoisington, 702 F. Supp. 1526, 1531-32 (D. Kan. 1988).
27. Ali v. Douglas Cable Commc’ns., 929 F.Supp. 1362, 1382 (D. Kan. 1996).
28. 698 So. 2d 618, 620 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
29. Ali, 929 F.Supp. at 1382.
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Peters will then argue that the intrusion by O’Plenty Enterprises,
Inc. was intentional. Per company policy, the IT Department activated
the software when Peters reported his laptop lost. However, the
software should have been deactivated when Peters called the company
back to report his laptop had been recovered. He will argue that liability
is based on the “the manner in which an individual obtains information.”27 In Purrelli v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, the court
found that intrusion upon seclusion “must always be intentional to be
tortious and cannot arise from a mere lack of due care.”28 Furthermore,
a defendant’s “motive or malice is not an element, for liability turns upon
the defendant’s action as opposed to motives.”29 Peters will argue that
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. acted intentionally simply by installing the
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software. He will further argue it is irrelevant that the company did not
intend to leave the software running because motive is irrelevant; it is
sufficient that the company left the software running.
However, O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will argue that the laptop was
company property and it had a right to monitor it. O’Plenty Enterprises,
Inc. will likely discuss that in Ali v. Douglas Cable Communications, the
defendant-company recorded employee telephone calls at work through
the employer’s telephone lines to determine if employees were making
personal calls.30 The court in that case found that the plaintiffs could
not claim an offensive intrusion because the calls that were supposed to
take place were to be “made for the benefit and in the interest of their
employer.”31 Furthermore, the monitoring was for only as long as necessary to determine if the calls were of a personal nature.32 O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will likely draw a similar conclusion and argue that the
software was deactivated as soon as practicable. However, Peters will
likely counter-argue that O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. should have turned
the software off as soon as he called to report the laptop was recovered.
Based on the above, Peters will likely argue that even though the
use of the software and recording was to catch thieves, courts have found
that an intentional intrusion upon a person’s seclusion can occur when
pictures have been taken for unrelated purposes. In Koeppel v. Speirs,
the court weighed an employee’s right to seclusion against an employer’s
attempts to justify invasions of privacy to present illegal activity.33 The
court in that case found that if a recording device “could have intruded
into the privacy of the plaintiff” it was an intrusion.34 In the case at bar,
this went even further, because the recording equipment actually recorded information and intruded into Peters’ privacy.
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will also argue that it did not intentionally intrude upon Peters’ privacy. The meaning of intent is “that the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or that he believes that
the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.”35 O’Plenty
Enterprises, Inc. did not intend to record Peters. Rather, the tracking
software was only installed as a means to recover lost or stolen equipment. And in this case, the software was only activated on the computer
because Peters reported it lost. The company, therefore, did not intend
the consequences of the software, namely the webcam photos taken of
Peters inside his home.
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The company will also argue that intent centers on the idea that a
person does not believe “he has either the necessary personal permission
or legal authority to do the intrusive act.”36 O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.
believed it had the authority to use this software. The software was designed and installed to be used in exactly this type of situation: when
company equipment was reported lost or stolen. Additionally, Peters
was aware of the use of the tracking software via notice in his employee
handbook (see Appendix A). Because Peters was aware tracking of company-issued electronics may take place, and Peters made no objection to
this when he received his handbook, the company had legal authority to
engage in this type of tracking.
Peters will then counter-argue that the intrusion was intentional because the company policy did not make any reference to video recording
or webcam photos as part of its software tracking. In Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., an employer installed recording equipment to watch and record employee activities in the office.37 The court found that this
recording rose to the level of intentional monitoring.38 Additionally, the
court determined that the written computer policy in effect was vague
because it only:
made clear that any monitoring and recording of employee activity, and
any resulting diminution in reasonable privacy expectations, were limited to ‘use of Company computers’ in the form of ‘e-mail’ messages,
electronic ‘files,’ and ‘web site’ data. . .there is no evidence that employees . . . had any indication that Hillsides would take the next drastic
step and use cameras and recording devices to view and videotape employees sitting at their desks and computer workstations, or moving
around their offices within camera range.39
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O’Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1989).
47 Cal. 4th 272, 289-90 (Cal. 2009).
Id. at 292.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 301.
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Based on Hernandez, Peters will argue that the policy in place at
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. is vague at best. O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.’s
policy makes no specific reference to webcam photos. Therefore, Peters
had no warning that his laptop use could subject him to being photographed in his private home. He also followed proper protocol and reported his laptop had been recovered. The Hernandez court found there
was no egregious behavior on the part of the company, because the cameras were placed in the office and the employees “were not at risk of being monitored or recorded during regular work hours and were never
actually caught on camera or videotape.”40 However, Peters will distinguish his situation from the Hernandez case on that point because he
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was actually recorded in the privacy of his own home and not at the
office.
However, O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will point out that the recording
was made from company property that had been lost. Peters was not
recorded with a stand-alone camera while working at the company headquarters like in the Hernandez case. Furthermore, the Hernandez court
points out that there is no cause of action “for accidental, misguided or
excusable acts of overstepping upon legitimate privacy rights.”41
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. accidentally left the software on longer than it
needed to only because it did not receive the voicemail for several hours.
Once the IT Department received notice the laptop had been recovered, it
immediately deactivated the software. O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will
show that the “[a]ctivation of the surveillance system was narrowly tailored in place, time, and scope, and was prompted by legitimate business
concerns.”42 The software was only to be activated when company equipment was reported lost or stolen and the record shows the software was
activated based upon Peters’ call. Furthermore, the software ran no
longer once the IT Department listened to the voicemail message from
Peters informing it that his laptop had been recovered.
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will also argue that as a company it had
the right to monitor its own property. In Lewis v. Dayton Hudson Corporation,43 a retail store concerned with shoplifters had signs in the dressing rooms informing customers the area was under surveillance by store
personnel, and the fitting room doors did not have locks nor did the doors
extend all the way down to the floor.44 A suspicious security guard
viewed a man in a dressing room from a grate in the ceiling above the
dressing room, and called the police.45 The appellate court upheld the
trial court in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim, because the security
guard’s conduct did not constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy
because the dressing room signs indicated that the area was under surveillance,46 and any “expectation of privacy he may have had in the absence of such signs was removed by the placement of the signs in the
fitting room.”47 The court also found that since retailers were faced with
an epidemic of shoplifting, and that fitting rooms provided the ideal location to conceal stolen property, it was not unreasonable for store security
“to view patrons in fitting rooms.”48 Likewise, in the case at bar,
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3. Highly Offensive to a Reasonable Person
The last element of the intrusion upon seclusion tort requires that
Peters show the intrusion of the webcam photos taken by O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.’s software was highly offensive to a reasonable person.
The issue of whether a defendant’s “intrusion is ‘highly offensive to a
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R. at 5.
77 F. Supp. 2d 914 (C.D. Ill. 1999).
Id. at 918.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 923.
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O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. did what it needed to do to recover stolen and
lost equipment. The software had even helped to recover and prosecute
six of the ten thieves of O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.’s laptops.49
Peters will argue that unlike the Lewis case where signs were prominent that shoppers would be monitored, in this case, he had no notice
that there was a possibility that pictures could be taken from the tracking software. He will reiterate the arguments based on the Hernandez
case, namely that the written policy in effect at O’Plenty Enterprises,
Inc. was vague and therefore ineffective to put him on notice of the tracking software’s capability to take pictures through the laptop’s webcam.
Furthermore, Peters will contend that the fact that O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. left the Lost & Found® software running for four hours and
produced fifty still photographs is sufficient to rise to the level of an intrusion or at the very least, a genuine issue of material fact of whether or
not this was an intentional intrusion.
Peters may also cite to Acuff v. IBP, Inc. for the proposition that the
use of cameras for innocent and unrelated purposes have been found to
constitute intentional intrusion upon a person’s seclusion.50 In Acuff,
the defendant installed cameras to record the premises, as he had been
subject to theft and was looking to catch the thief.51 Unbeknownst to the
defendant while the camera was recording the premises, it captured
nurses treating patients within the cameras’ view.52 The court still
found that it would be possible for a jury to conclude that the defendant
had acted intentionally.53
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will seek to distinguish Acuff from the
case at bar. Unlike the defendant in Acuff who did not cease recording
when it became aware that physical examinations were taking place in
the room in question,54 O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will argue that it immediately ceased using the Lost & Found® software once the IT department had received the voicemail message from Peters reporting his
laptop had been recovered.

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 90 Side B

10/02/2013 12:46:52

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\29-4\SFT405.txt

688

unknown

Seq: 16

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

1-OCT-13

14:53

[Vol. XXIX

C M
Y K

10/02/2013 12:46:52

55. Rafferty v. Hartford Courant Co., 36 Conn.Supp. 239, 241 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1980).
56. Candebat v. Flanagan, 487 So.2d 207, 209 (Miss. 1986).
57. 472 S.E.2d 350, 352 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
58. Id. at 354.
59. Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (where the court found
that the mere “installation of the hidden viewing devices along constitutes an interference
with that privacy which a reasonable person would find highly offensive”).
60. 487 So.2d at 209.
61. Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, 944 P.2d 374, 379 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
62. Id. at 378.
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reasonable person’ is for a jury to decide.”55 However, in Candebat v.
Flanagan, the court found that a plaintiff has to meet a heavy burden of
showing that an interference with his seclusion is of the “kind that
‘would be highly offensive to the ordinary, reasonable man, as the result
of conduct to which the reasonable man would strongly object.’ ”56
Peters will likely argue that being photographed inside one’s home is
highly offensive. For example, in Miller v. Brooks, the plaintiff’s estranged wife placed a video camera in her husband’s bedroom.57 The
court found that a jury could conclude that such intrusion is highly offensive to a reasonable person.58 Peters will argue that the pictures taken
by his company issued laptop captured personal images taken inside the
privacy of his own home and the pictures were taken without his knowledge. Additionally, Peters will discuss courts that have found liability
merely by setting up recording equipment capable of this type of intrusion without any evidence that pictures or recordings were taken.59
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will distinguish the Candebat case by arguing that a “plaintiff must show some bad faith or utterly reckless prying to recover on an invasion of privacy cause of action.”60 A court
should consider factors including “ ‘the degree of intrusion, the context,
conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion as well as the intruder’s motives and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, and
the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded.’ ”61 In this case, the
company will argue that there was no bad faith. Peters was aware of
tracking software in the laptop and that it would be activated if a laptop
was reported lost or stolen. Furthermore, the goal of the software was to
help recover lost or stolen property and not to monitor or spy on employees. The software was deactivated as soon as the IT department listened
to the message from Peters about the laptop’s recovery.
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will argue that the pictures were not
highly offensive because they did not catch Peters in any type of compromising positions. He was merely in his home office working. Furthermore, the company will also reiterate that for the pictures to support a
claim for intrusion upon seclusion more is required than just an oblique
reference to sexual matters.62 Simply by capturing some images show-
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ing Peters with his partner does not rise to the level of highly offensive.
Peters will counter-argue this point by discussing the In re Marriage
of Tigges case, where the court found that it is not the content of the
recording that triggers liability, but the fact that the recording was without “consent at a time and place and under circumstances in which” a
person has “a reasonable expectation of privacy.”63 It is not what the
laptop captured (personal pictures of Peters), but just the fact that the
laptop captured anything at all inside Peters’ home that is highly offensive. Peters will also argue that courts have considered people’s sexual
lives “normally entirely private matters.”64
NOTE: Some courts have required a fourth element namely that the
intrusion cause anguish and suffering.65 This element may be discussed,
but is not necessary for establishing liability under the Restatement.
Moreover, there are relatively no facts to support this element.
VIOLATION OF MARSHALL STATE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
General
The Marshall State Human Rights Act is located in the Marshall
State Code. Under the statute, an employer may not “act with respect
to. . .discharge, discipline, tenure or terms, privileges or conditions of
employment on the basis of unlawful discrimination.” The statute defines “unlawful discrimination” as “discrimination against a person because of his or her. . .sexual orientation.”66
Elements
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63. 758 N.W.2d 824, 830 (Iowa 2008).
64. Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp. Of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488, 498 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
65. Melvin v. Burling, 49 N.E.2d 1011, 1012 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
66. Appendix B.
67. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Griffith v. City of
Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004); Zaderaka v. Ill. Human Rights Comm’n, 545
N.E.2d 684, 687 (Ill. 1989).
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Marshall has adopted the two approaches for determining employment discrimination cases under the MHRA: 1) by “direct evidence” of
discrimination; or, 2) in an absence of direct evidence, the four-part McDonnell Douglas analysis.67
Under the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework, an employee
bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) he or she is a member of a protected class; (2) he
or she was performing satisfactorily; (3) he or she was discharged despite
the adequacy of his or her work; and (4) a similarly situated employee
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who was not a member of the protected group was not discharged.68
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to defendant to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the adverse employment action.69 If the employer articulates such a
reason, the plaintiff then bears the burden of establishing that the proffered nondiscriminatory reason was mere pretext for discriminatory animus.70 However, a final determination of unlawful discrimination must
be established by and supported with a factual finding.71 Throughout
the proceedings, the ultimate burden of persuasion is on the employee.72
McDonnell Douglas Analysis
1. Member of a Protected Class

2. Satisfactory Performance
Peter will argue that this court should consider evidence that he was
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68. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; see also Owens v. Dep’t of Human
Rights, 826 N.E.2d 539, 544 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
69. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Zaderaka 545 N.E.2d at 687.
70. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
71. Ill. J. Livingston Co. v. Human Rights Comm’n, 704 N.E.2d 797 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
72. Owens, 826 N.E.2d at 539.
73. Marshall Human Rights Act § 1-102(A) (2010).
74. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
75. See Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008);
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
76. R. at 15.
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O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. is specifically barred from terminating
Peters’ employment on the basis of his sexual orientation. “It is the public policy of this State . . . [t]o secure for all individuals within the State
of Marshall freedom from discrimination . . . because of his or her . . .
sexual orientation . . . in connection with employment . . .”73 As a result,
Peters will likely argue that he can make a prima facie case for discrimination under the MHRA. Peters will argue that he is part of a protected
class, namely because of his sexual orientation. Some state courts have
held that sexual orientation is a suspect74 or quasi-suspect classification75 and thus, classifications that discriminate against gay persons are
to be reviewed under the intermediate scrutiny test.
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will not dispute that Peters, as a homosexual male, is a member of a protected class under the MHRA.76
Rather, O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will likely argue that Peters fails to
establish the other three elements of the McDonnell Douglas test, i.e.
that he was performing satisfactorily, that he was discharged even with
an adequate work performance and that O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.
treated him differently from similarly situated employees.
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meeting O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.’s expectations.77 Peters will claim
that his performance during his twelve year history with the company
has consistently been more than satisfactory, evidenced by his promotions and increased job responsibilities. He will state that the only instance of poor performance was related to the coordination of Timmons’
political fundraising event in Petersville, which was not related to his
core job responsibilities as Regional Project Supervisor. He will argue
that there were other personal circumstances that lead to the mix-up
with the event in Petersville, namely that he was distraught over the
death of his beloved Labrador Retriever.
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will counter-argue that his performance
had been slipping. His performance had started to suffer and he made
significant mistakes at a campaign event.78 The company ordered him to
fly back due to the mistakes at the event.79 Furthermore, Peters also
lost his company issued laptop because he was distracted.80
3. Discharge/Adverse Employment Action
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77. See Cline v. Catholic Dioceses of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 662-63 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 504-05 (1993)).
78. R. at 5- 6.
79. R. at 6.
80. Id.
81. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 2007); Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t
of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004).
82. R. at 7.
83. 993 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1993)
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Peters will argue that he was summarily discharged after it was revealed that he was homosexual, and that adverse employment action resulted from O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.’s discrimination against his
sexual orientation.81 Peters will focus on the fact that he was terminated shortly after Mr. O’Plenty, who had openly condemned homosexuality, discovered Peters’ sexual orientation.82 Peters, therefore, will
draw the conclusion that he suffered a decidedly adverse employment
action under circumstances that give rise to an inference of
discrimination.
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will counter-argue that Peters fails to
make a prima facie case for discrimination under the MHRA because his
performance was not satisfactory. The company might cite to Hong v.
Children’s Memorial Hospital, and argue that the focus should not be on
an employee’s past performance, but this court should look to whether
the employee was performing satisfactorily at the time of the adverse
employment action.83 Ignoring the shifting nature of performance from
time to time would render the satisfactory performance requirement
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meaningless.84 Moreover, O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. may argue that the
determination of whether a job performance is satisfactory belongs to the
employer.85 It will point to the Record, which it will claim provides sufficient evidence to support the fact that Peters’ performance at the time of
his termination was not satisfactory. O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will reiterate the fact that Peters’ performance “has suffered during the last four
months of his employment”86 and there were mistakes made by Peters
during recent events.87 The company will seek to show that those errors
caused “major backlash” and were “extremely harmful” to the company’s
reputation, thus fully supporting the company’s determination of Peters’
performance as less than satisfactory at the time of discharge.
Should Peters insist on rebutting these claims by arguing that the
events in which he exhibited poor performance “were not even part of his
duties” and “something incidental,”88 O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will argue that courts have routinely deferred to employers on issues relating to
the reasonableness of its employment criteria.89 In effect, a plaintiff is
not entitled to get his or her case before a jury by contending that the
demands of the employer were not reasonably related to the performance
of the job.90
4. Similarly Situated Employees Were Treated Differently
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84. See Weihaupt v. Am. Med. Ass’n., 874 F.2d 419, 427 (7th Cir. 1989).
85. See Thornley v. Penton Publ’g, Inc., 104 F.3d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Whether job
performance was satisfactory depends on the employer’s criteria for the performance of the
job—not the standards that may seem reasonable to the jury or judge.”).
86. R. at 12.
87. R. at 6 (where it is described how Peters e-mailed the wrong VIP list to security
and forgot to arrange the gubernatorial candidate’s transportation).
88. R. at 11.
89. See, e.g., Stanojev v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 921–22 (2d Cir. 1981) (defending the notion that an employee may be discharged “on the basis of subjective business
judgments, for any reason that is not discriminatory”).
90. Thornley, 104 F.3d at 29.
91. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008).
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Peters will argue that he was “treated differently than similarly situated non-protected employees.”91 Peters will provide evidence that
showed that in at least two other cases, where the employees were
known to be heterosexual and affiliated with the same political party as
Mr. O’Plenty, Mr. O’Plenty treated them much more leniently. More
specifically J. Erwin, who accidentally communicated proprietary information to a third party, was just re-assigned to a different position. Similarly, L. Walker, a regional supervisor discriminated against women
working for O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. and was not terminated. He was
suspended with pay, and after a few months, was able to resume his duties without fully completing the sensitivity training he was ordered to
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take. Peters will claim that if it had not been revealed by the photographs taken by the Lost & Found® software that he is homosexual, he
would likely still be employed by O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will likely focus on the differences between Peters’ conduct and that of the allegedly similarly situated employees. The company may cite City of North Las Vegas v. State Local
Government Employee-Management Relations Board, which states:
[i]n determining whether two employees are similarly situated as required for employment discrimination claim, a court must look at all
relevant factors, depending upon the context of the case, and such factors may include: (1) whether the employees were subject to the same
performance evaluation standards, (2) whether the employees engaged
in comparable conduct, (3) whether the employees dealt with the same
supervisor, (4) whether the employees were subject to the same disciplinary standards, and (5) whether the employees had comparable experience, education, and qualifications, if the employer took these factors
into account in making its decision.92
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92. 261 P.3d 1071, 1079 (Nev. 2011).
93. Id. at 1079.
94. 91 So.3d 165, 171 (Fla. 2012).
95. Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 405 (7th Cir. 2007).
96. See Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 735 (7th Cir. 2008) (describing a
meaningful comparison as one that serves to eliminate variables to isolate discriminatory
animus).
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O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will explain that the facts and circumstances of the other employees’ conduct were substantially different than
Peters’ conduct and therefore they cannot be considered comparators.
Should Peters argue that comparators do not have to be identical
situations, O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. may counter that while the situations do not have to be identical, “there must be a reasonably close resemblance of the facts and circumstances of the plaintiff’s and
comparator’s cases.”93 The company may also cite to City of West Palm
Beach v McCray, which elaborates on the requirement for comparators to
have engaged in the same or similar conduct, “[i]n determining whether
employees are similarly situated for purposes of a disparate treatment
employment discrimination claim, the most important factors are the nature of the offenses and punishments imposed; however, the quantity
and quality of the comparator’s misconduct must be nearly identical.”94
The similarly situated element does not require a strict “one-to-one mapping between employees.”95 O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will claim that
the cases of Erwin and Walker do not share enough features with Peters
to allow for a “meaningful comparison.”96
O’Plently may also cite to Perez-Dickson v. City of Bridgeport, in
which the court stated:
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[a]n employee who is offered as an individual to whom plaintiff in employment discrimination case seeks to compare herself in McDonnell
Douglas analysis on question of whether adverse action took place
under circumstances permitting an inference of discrimination will be
deemed to be similarly situated in all material respects, if (1) the plaintiff and those he maintains were similarly situated were subject to the
same workplace standards, and (2) the conduct for which the employer
imposed discipline was of comparable seriousness.97

Consequently, O’Plenty will argue that because Peters’ misconduct
was substantially more serious, it is not comparable to the two other employees mentioned in this action.
5. Employer Non-Discriminatory Justification for Adverse
Employment Action

43 A.3d 69, 93 (Conn., 2012).
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Zaderaka 545 N.E.2d at 687.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
Ill. J. Livingston Co. v. Human Rights Comm’n, 704 N.E.2d 797 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
Id.
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If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.98 If the employer articulates
such a reason, the plaintiff then bears the burden of establishing that
the proffered nondiscriminatory reason was mere pretext for discriminatory animus.99 However, a final determination of unlawful discrimination must be established by and supported with a factual finding.100
In this case, O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. might argue that where the
court may decide that Peters met his burden to prove his prima facie
case, it will still prevail because it is able to produce evidence that Peters’ employment was terminated for a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason.101 “The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant’s
evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated
against the plaintiff.”102 The company will contend that, after deliberations by the Executive Board, the company terminated Peters’ employment because of poor performance. The significance of the adverse
employment action was due to the impact of Peters’ actions to the reputation and image of O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.
provided evidence of extensive negative publicity of the company and Mr.
O’Plenty personally, related to the incident, including press releases,
posts on several political and industry related websites and blogs that
pointed out the “fiasco” and the incompetency of O’Plenty Enterprises,
Inc.’s employees. In response to Peters argument that the discipline he
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received (termination) was more severe than that administered to other
similarly situated employees, the company is likely to argue that “the
unfairness or unreasonableness of an employer’s conduct is irrelevant, so
long as it was not motivated by an employee’s protected
characteristic.”103
Peters will argue that “poor performance” was merely pretext for
terminating him because he is homosexual. O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.
will counter-argue that Peters failed to provide any evidence that it terminated his employment because he was homosexual. Since O’Plenty
Enterprises, Inc. has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for Peters’ termination, Peters must persuade the trier of fact that the
company intentionally discriminated against him.104 “[I]n attempting to
satisfy this burden, the plaintiff . . . must be afforded the opportunity to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination.”105 “To prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the reason articulated by the employer was merely a pretext for discrimination and not the true reason. . . the plaintiff must show that the employer’s reason was both false and motivated by discriminatory
intent.”106 O’Plenty may also refer to Rice v. Offshore Systems, Inc.,
which explains:

6. Termination of an At-Will Employee
Peters will rebut O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc.’s argument that since
Peters was an at-will employee, the company was within its rights to
terminate Peters at any time and for any reason it chose. Peters may
argue that even though it is widely recognized that based on the at-will
doctrine “if the employee is free to quit at any time, then the employer

C M
Y K

Young v Ill. Human Rights Comm’n, 2012 Ill. App. 112, 204 (1st Cir. 2012).
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43, (2000).
Id. at 143.
Henry v New Jersey Dept. of Human Serv., 9 A.3d 882, 889 (N.J., 2010).
272 P.3d 865, 872 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
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employee[s] can show that the employer’s proffered reason for an adverse employment action is pretext for discrimination in several ways:
(1) the employer’s reasons have no basis in fact; (2) if employer’s reasons
have a basis in fact, by showing that they were not really motivating
factors; or (3) if they are factors, by showing that they were jointly insufficient to motivate the adverse employment decision, e.g., the proffered reason was so removed in time that it was unlikely to be the
cause, or the proffered reason applied to other employees with equal or
greater force and the employer made a different decision with respect to
them.107
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must be free to dismiss at any time.”108 Peters will claim that the at-will
doctrine has evolved to accommodate changes in legal, economic, and social perspectives. Peters will likely refer to a number of cases that have
established that, employees discharged for reasons judged to be “retaliatory,” “abusive,” “malicious,” “in bad faith,” or against public policy an
employee have a cause of action for wrongful discharge.109
Peters will likely argue that the court in Smith rejected an argument that an at-will employee could be fired for any reason, including a
discriminatory one. There, an at-will employee claimed she was terminated because of her gender, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.110 The court found that even an at-will employee like Smith
was protected from discriminatory termination because Title VII “codifies the public policy against gender-based discrimination.”111 Therefore, an at-will employee cannot be terminated for discriminatory
reasons when such an action is prohibited by public policy or statute.112
Therefore, Peters will argue that an employer may not terminate an atwill employee if the particular basis for that termination is forbidden by
statute.113 Similarly, Peters’ termination from O’Plenty Enterprises,
Inc. falls clearly into the public policy exception of the at-will doctrine
because the Act specifically identifies discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as a violation of public policy.114
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will likely argue that Peters was an atwill employee during that time and could be terminated without
cause.115 The company will refer to the established at-will doctrine that
provides that if an employee is classified as at-will, an employer may
ordinarily discharge that employee for good cause, for no cause, or for a

10/02/2013 12:46:52
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108. Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., Inc., 653 F.2d 1057, 1061 (5th Cir. 1981), there
are some limitations.
109. Gibson v. Estes, 338 F. App’x 476, 477 (5th Cir. 2009); Clark v. Modern Grp. Ltd., 9
F.3d 321, 323 (3d Cir. 1993); LaScola v. U.S. Sprint Commc’ns, 946 F.2d 559, 566 (7th Cir.
1991); Terry v. Legato Sys., Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 566, 569 (D. Md. 2003); Silva v. Albuquerque Assembly & Distribution Freeport Warehouse Corp., 738 P.2d 513, 515 (N.M. 1987)
(“The sources of public policy include legislation; administrative rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions.”); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980);
see also Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981) (“The at-will employment doctrine can be modified “through public policy reflected in the constitution [or
in] a statute.”) Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 92 (Mo. 2010).
110. Smith, 76 F.3d at 419-20.
111. Id. at 427, 429.
112. Id. at 426.
113. Id.
114. Marshall Human Rights Act, § 1-102 (2010). Section 1-102 of the the Act further
notes that discriminatory practices linked to employment practices are consummately
against public policy.
115. R. at 11-12.
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116. Miracle v. Bell Cnty. Emergency Med. Servs., 237 S.W.3d 555, 558 (Ky. Ct. App.
2007).
117. Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass’n, 14 F.3d 526, 531 (10th Cir.1994) (citing
E.E.O.C. v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 942 (4th Cir.1992)).
118. Schoenfeld v. Battitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 1999).
119. 199 F.3d 1126, 1142 (10th Cir. 1999).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1134-35.
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cause that some might even view as morally indefensible.116 O’Plenty
Enterprises, Inc. will likely also argue that the company did not terminate Peters for any reason that could be determined as “retaliatory,”
“abusive,” “malicious,” “in bad faith,” or against public policy, but because Peters’ work performance during the Timmons campaign led to
negative publicity and a loss of company reputation.
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will also argue that Peters also failed to
demonstrate a nexus between the allegedly discriminatory statements
and the employer’s decision to terminate the employee.117 O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will further argue that the statements made by O’Plenty
during a fundraising event do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination based on sexual orientation. Direct evidence is defined as evidence submitted by plaintiff that, if believed, proves the existence of
discriminatory intent without an additional inference.118
O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. may look to Perry v. Woodward, in support of its argument. In Perry, a Hispanic employee introduced evidence
that while at work the employer made demeaning and derogatory comments to and about Hispanics.119 The court rejected the comments as
direct evidence because the comments by the employer were not directed
at the employee and there was no indication that the employer intended
the comments to be directed to the employee.120 The employer’s comments were nothing more than an expression of personal opinion and did
not constitute direct evidence of a racially motivated discharge.121 Similarly, O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. will argue that those statements by Mr.
O’Plenty were made during a campaign fundraiser, expressing his personal views of homosexuality, the statements were not directed at Peters, the statements were not purporting to describe Peters, nor were the
statements made at a time when Peters’ employment prospects were at
issue. Rather, Mr. O’Plenty’s statements were made in his personal capacity and it was the Executive Board of O’Plenty Enterprises, Inc. that
terminated Peters. Thus, the company will argue that this court should
find that there is no sufficient evidence to support Peters’ claim that his
termination was in violation of public policy.
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APPENDIX A
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK

OF

O’PLENTY ENTERPRISES, INC. (“COMPANY”).

Section 1.1 – The following terms and conditions are designed to
tell you (“employee”) about Company’s policies.
PLEASE READ THESE TERMS CAREFULLY AS YOUR EMPLOYMENT WITH COMPANY CONSTITUTES ACCEPTANCE OF
THEM.
[. . .]
Section 2.5 – Computer equipment, including laptops, may not be
used for personal use – this includes word processing and computing
functions. It is forbidden for employee to install any other programs to a
company computer without the written permission of employee’s supervisor. These forbidden programs include, but are not limited to, unlicensed software, pirated music, and pornography. The copying of
programs installed on Company computers is not allowed unless you are
specifically directed to do so in writing by your supervisor.
Section 2.6 – Company reserves the right to initiate and activate
tracking software in order to track lost or stolen any type of company
issued electronic equipment.
Section 2.7 – Employee must report if company issued electronic
equipment has been recovered.
[. . .]
Section 3.5 – An employee is allowed access to employee’s Human
Resources file during or after employee’s tenure with Company.
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APPENDIX B
MARSHALL HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
Sec. 1-102. Declaration of Policy. It is the public policy of this
State:
(A) Freedom from Unlawful Discrimination. To secure for all individuals within the State of Marshall freedom from discrimination against
any individual because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, ancestry, age, order of protection status, marital status, physical
or mental disability, military status, sexual orientation, or unfavorable
discharge from military service in connection with employment, real estate transactions, access to financial credit, and the availability of public
accommodations.
[. . .]
ARTICLE 2. EMPLOYMENT

ARTICLE 10. CIRCUIT COURT ACTIONS

C M
Y K
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Sec. 10-102. Court Actions. (A) Circuit Court Actions. (1) An aggrieved party may commence a civil action in an appropriate Circuit
Court not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 96 Side A

Sec. 2-101. Definitions. The following definitions are applicable
strictly in the context of this Article.
(A) Employee.
(1) “Employee” includes:
(a) Any individual performing services for remuneration within this
State for an employer;
(b) An apprentice;
(c) An applicant for any apprenticeship.
(B) Employer.
(1) “Employer” includes:
(a) Any person employing 15 or more employees within Marshall
during 20 or more calendar weeks within the calendar year of or preceding the alleged violation;
(b) Any person employing one or more employees when a complainant alleges civil rights violation due to unlawful discrimination based
upon his or her physical or mental handicap unrelated to ability or sexual harassment;
(c) . . .
(d) . . .
(e) . . .
[. . .]
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alleged civil rights violation or the breach of a conciliation or settlement
agreement entered into under this Act, whichever occurs last, to obtain
appropriate relief with respect to the alleged civil rights violation or
breach.
(2) The computation of such 2-year period shall not include any time
during which an administrative proceeding under this Act was pending
with respect to a complaint or charge under this Act based upon the alleged civil rights violation. This paragraph does not apply to actions arising from a breach of a conciliation or settlement agreement.
(3) . . .
(4) . . .
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